Issue 2

Volume 13 JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
Summer 2004

Firm Organization and the Structure of Retail Markets

Emin M. Dinlersoz
This paper analyzes the structure of retail markets by highlighting the differential pattern exhibited across local markets by two different types of firm organization: chain stores versus stand-alone stores. Data from retail alcoholic beverage industry in California suggest that the number of chain stores is proportional to city size. Further evidence on the sales of establishments indicates that average size of a stand-alone store virtually is invariant to city size, whereas chain stores appear to get larger as city size increases. Theories consistent with these findings are discussed.

Does Advertising Overcome Brand Loyalty? Evidence from the Breakfast-Cereals Market

Matthew Shum
In differentiated product markets where consumer preferences are characterized by brand loyalty, an important role for advertising may be to overcome brand loyalty by encouraging consumers to switch to less familiar brands. Using a scanner panel dataset of breakfast-cereal purchases, I find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that advertising counteracts the tendencies of brand loyalty toward repeat purchasing. Equivalently, advertising reduces switching costs in this market. Furthermore, counterfactual experiments demonstrate that in markets with brand loyalty, advertising is an attractive and effective option—relative to alternative promotional activities, such as price discounts—of stimulating demand for a brand.

Durable Goods, Monopoly Maintenance, and Time Inconsistency

Hodaka Morita and Michael Waldman
Durable-goods producers frequently choose to monopolize the maintenance markets for their own products. This paper shows that, similar to leasing, one reason a firm may employ this practice is that it reduces or even eliminates problems due to time inconsistency. We first demonstrate this result in a setting closely related to Bulow's (1982) classic analysis of durable-goods monopoly. We then show the result in a setting similar to those considered in Waldman (1996, 1997) and Hendel and Lizzeri (1999), in which new and used units are imperfect substitutes. The paper also discusses alternative explanations for the phenomenon.

Durable-Goods Monopoly with Endogenous Innovation

Jae Nahm
While selling an existing product, a durable-goods monopolist may develop a new, improved product. The firm must consider the interaction between its intertemporal pricing and research and development (R&D) decisions. The interactions show a sharp dichotomy depending on pricing regimes. When it is optimal for the firm to continue to sell the old model along with the new model, the interactions disappear. However, when it is optimal for the firm to discontinue the sale of the old model after introducing the new model, the firm will face a time-inconsistency problem in its R&D decision.

Entrepreneurial Boldness and Excessive Investment

Isabelle Brocas and Juan D. Carrillo
We analyze investment by a population of hyperbolic discounting entrepreneurs. In order to avoid inefficient procrastination, agents with good prospects about their chances of success may choose to forego free information and to invest boldly. This explains an excessive level of investment in the economy. Building on this observation, we show that low risk-free interest rates favor bold entrepreneurship and entry mistakes. Furthermore, public intervention can be socially desirable: Forcing agents to acquire information before deciding whether to invest may reduce competitive interest rates and may be beneficial for all individuals in the economy

Preference-Based Discrimination and Profit: On the Profitability of Discriminatory Spatial Policy

Rodney B. Wallace
In many markets, firms are able to conduct discriminatory strategies based on whether a customer prefers a competitors' product or their own. This article considers the impact of such discrimination in duopoly models in which firms set prices and conduct precontract-customization efforts for some customers. We identify two effects: (1) The ability to conduct preference-based discrimination increases equilibrium profit as long as long as precontract customization is at least modestly important in competitive dynamics; and (2) The ability to conduct preference-based discrimination enhances social welfare if any precontract customization is done.