Special Issue
Spectrum Auctions
Introduction
John McMillan, Michael Rothschild and Robert Wilson
The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment
Peter Cramton
This paper analyzes six spectrum auctions conducted by the Federal Communications Commission from July 1994 to May 1996. These auctions were simultaneous multiple-round auctions in which collections of licenses were auctioned simultaneously. This auction form proved remarkably successful.
This paper analyzes six spectrum auctions conducted by the Federal Communications Commission from July 1994 to May 1996. These auctions were simultaneous multiple-round auctions in which collections of licenses were auctioned simultaneously. This auction form proved remarkably successful.
Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan
We examine bid data from the first two broadband PCS spectrum auctions for evidence of value synergies. First, we estimate a benchmark regression for the determinants of final auction prices. Then, we include variables reflecting the extent to which bidders ultimately won or already owned the adjacent wireless properties.
We examine bid data from the first two broadband PCS spectrum auctions for evidence of value synergies. First, we estimate a benchmark regression for the determinants of final auction prices. Then, we include variables reflecting the extent to which bidders ultimately won or already owned the adjacent wireless properties.
Making More from Less: Strategic Demand Reduction in the FCC Spectrum Auctions
Robert J. Weber
When multiple items are sold through the use of simultaneous ascending-bid auctions, bidders can find it in their mutual interests to reduce their aggregate demand for the items while prices are still low relative to the bidders' valuations. The FCC's first broadband PCS auction provides examples of how such mutual reductions might be arranged even when the bidders are not allowed to communicate with one another outside of the auction arena.
When multiple items are sold through the use of simultaneous ascending-bid auctions, bidders can find it in their mutual interests to reduce their aggregate demand for the items while prices are still low relative to the bidders' valuations. The FCC's first broadband PCS auction provides examples of how such mutual reductions might be arranged even when the bidders are not allowed to communicate with one another outside of the auction arena.
Up in the Air: GTE’s Experience in the MTA Auction for Personal Communication Services Licenses
David J. Salant
In late 1994, GTE, one of the largest telecommunications firms in the world, entered an auction for the rights to provide personal communications services (PCS) using the electromagnetic spectrum. The administering agency, the Federal Communications Commission, adopted a novel multiple-round format for the PCS auction.
In late 1994, GTE, one of the largest telecommunications firms in the world, entered an auction for the rights to provide personal communications services (PCS) using the electromagnetic spectrum. The administering agency, the Federal Communications Commission, adopted a novel multiple-round format for the PCS auction.
Second-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Payoffs: An Experimental Investigation
Christopher Avery and John H. Kagel
A series of two-player, second-price common-value auctions are reported. In symmetric auctions, bidders suffer from a winner's curse. In asymmetric auctions in which one bidder has a private value advantage, the effect on bids and prices is proportional rather than explosive (the prediction of Nash equilibrium bidding theory).
A series of two-player, second-price common-value auctions are reported. In symmetric auctions, bidders suffer from a winner's curse. In asymmetric auctions in which one bidder has a private value advantage, the effect on bids and prices is proportional rather than explosive (the prediction of Nash equilibrium bidding theory).
Laboratory Experimental Testbeds: Application to the PCS Auction
Charles R. Plott
The paper reviews the uses of laboratory experimental economics methods in the background research and implementation of the Personal Communication Systems auctions held by the Federal Communications Commission. The applications began during the rule making process with the testing of broad rules that might be implemented.
The paper reviews the uses of laboratory experimental economics methods in the background research and implementation of the Personal Communication Systems auctions held by the Federal Communications Commission. The applications began during the rule making process with the testing of broad rules that might be implemented.
Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms
John O. Ledyard, David Porter and Antonio Rangel
This paper reports the results of over 130 auctions conducted under controlled conditions to examine the robustness of several auction mechanisms to allocate multiple objects. The simultaneous discrete auction process used by the Federal Communications Commission to allocate Personal Communications licenses was contrasted with a sequential auction and a combinatorial auction over a variety of demand conditions.
This paper reports the results of over 130 auctions conducted under controlled conditions to examine the robustness of several auction mechanisms to allocate multiple objects. The simultaneous discrete auction process used by the Federal Communications Commission to allocate Personal Communications licenses was contrasted with a sequential auction and a combinatorial auction over a variety of demand conditions.
Address
Harvard Business School
Soldiers Field Road
Boston, MA 02163
617-496-8392
Published with
