Issue 3

Volume 4 JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
Fall 1995

Organizational Diseconomies of Scale

R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan
Private information creates a cost of operating a hierarchy, which becomes larger as the hierarchical distance between the information source and the decision maker increases. When information about a firm's capabilities is dispersed among the individuals in the firm, production is inefficient even though everyone behaves rationally. Because hierarchies need rents in order to function, a firm with a long hierarchy may not be viable in a competitive industry.

Managerial Incentives Based on Acquisition of Information

Bernard Caillaud and Bruno Jullien
In a moral hazard setting, we model the fact that the agent may get private signals about the final outcome of his effort before the public realization of this outcome. Actions affect both the distribution of the outcome and the quality of the agent's private information. We compare simple contracts, based on output only, with revelation contracts, based on output and messages about signals.

Product Rivalry with Multiple Strategic Weapons: An Analysis of Price and Advertising Competition

Margaret E. Slade
A dynamic model of product rivalry is developed for a market in which firms choose price and advertising intensity. The model, a state-space game, is implemented using data that consist of weekly price, sales, and promotional activity for four brands of saltine crackers sold by four chains of grocery stores in a small town. A number of questions can be asked of this data.

Incentive Contracting Under Limited Liability

Eun-Soo Park
We examine the nature of incentive schemes between the principal and the risk-neutral agent in the presence of the agent's limited liability and ex ante action choice. We consider alternative schemes when a simple rental contract is infeasible due to the limited liability of the agent and study the effectiveness of a performance bonus scheme in achieving the first-best outcome. We also discuss some implications of such schemes in real practices.

Input Market Competition and the Make-or-Buy Decision

Gerald T. Garvey and Rohan Pitchford
Recent theories of vertical integration based on incomplete contracts assume perfect competition on at least one side of the market. As a result, the make-or-buy choice has no redistributive effect and will reflect efficiency considerations only. This paper introduces imperfect competition into an otherwise standard model of a vertical relationship with noncontractable specific investments.

Why Retailers Sell Private Labels

David E. Mills
This paper interprets private label marketing as a retailer instrument for overcoming the double-marginalization problem inherent in the distribution of well-known manufacturer brands. Retailers with some degree of market power carry private label substitutes for popular national brands in order to capture more profit from the vertical structures they share with brand manufacturers. The net effect of private label marketing is to improve the performance of distribution channels.