Volume 33, 2024 Issue 4 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy – Journal of Economics & Management Strategy

Bundling of authority and accountability in organizations

Susheng Wang
Decision-making authority is often bundled with accountability. Decision makers are usually made accountable for failure.

Does sunk-cost affect prices? Evidence from the US airline industry

Long Shi, Qihong Liu, Myongjin Kim
In contrast to the extensive literature on behavior bias by individuals, studies on behavior bias by firms have been relatively scarce.

Product variety and design in the age of peer-to-peer sharing

Yusuke Zennyo
The rise of peer-to-peer (P2P) sharing, exemplified recently by increased car-sharing and clothing-sharing, has altered our consumption style.

The role of registering trademarks on firms’ innovation: Evidence from Chinese firms

Yili Liu, Puyang Sun, Yong Zhao
Firms are used to registering trademarks for intellectual property protection which ultimately increases their innovations.

Two-sided productivity heterogeneity, firm boundaries, and assortative matching

Kaniṣka Dam, Daniel Ripperger-Suhler, Konstantinos Serfes
We consider a market where each firm is created by the combination of two complementary assets that are heterogeneous in their productivity.

Branding vertical product line extensions

Thomas Jungbauer, Christian Schmid
Firms that sell vertically differentiated products infrequently roll out multiple products at the same time. In fact, it is often a firm already selling a well-established product that decides to expand up- or downwards when such an opportunity arises.

Championing and shaming in a credence good market: Which one to use?

Alexandre Volle, Patrick González
We analyze the performance of the championing and shaming inquiries by a Nongovernmental Organization in a signaling game played by a monopoly that sells a credence good to an uninformed consumer.

Sales-based compensation and collusion with heterogeneous firms

Jeongwoo Lee, Douglas C. Turner
Pricing and output decisions are often delegated to managers compensated on the basis of sales. Prior literature has shown that when firms are homogeneous, the delegation of pricing or output decisions to managers, compensated on the basis of sales, does not facilitate collusion.

Under the shadow of the future: Gender-specific reactions to (un)certain future interactions

Janina Kleinknecht, Clara Ulmer
Expectations are a key element of strategic environments. As it has already been shown that men's performance in current competitions is affected by the expected future opponents' strength, we investigate whether women are overshadowed by future competitors as well.

Confidence management in contests

Shanglyu Deng, Hanming Fang, Qiang Fu, Zenan Wur
An incumbent employee competes against a new hire for bonuses or promotions. The incumbent's perception of the new hire's ability distribution is biased.

Issue 4

Volume 33 JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
Winter 2024