Issue 1

Volume 32 JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
Spring 2023

Can asymmetric punishment deter endogenous bribery

Lin Hu and Mandar Oak
This paper studies the effects of asymmetric punishment of bribery on both bribery and compliance with regulations. We show that, under symmetric punishment, inducing whistle-blowing has no effect on the frequency of bribery.

Upstream market structure and downstream partial ownership

Jie Shuai, Mengyuan Xia, and Chenhang Zeng
Existing studies on partial ownership usually overlook the effects of vertically related markets. Our paper highlights the importance of the upstream market on downstream firms' incentives to acquire partial ownership and the consequent welfare implications.

National pricing with local quality competition

Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen, Bjørn Olav Johansen, and Odd Rune Straume
We study the incentives of national retail chains to adopt national (uniform) prices across local markets that differ in size and competition intensity. We show that absent quality competition, the chains will never use national pricing. However, if quality competition is sufficiently strong there exist equilibria where at least one of the chains adopts national pricing.

Truly standard-essential patents? A semantics-based analysis

Lorenz Brachtendorf, Fabian Gaessler, and Dietmar Harhoff
This paper introduces a semantics-based method for approximating the standard essentiality of patents. We provide details on the procedure that generates the measure of standard essentiality and present the results of several validation and robustness exercises.

Which is better for durable goods producers, exclusive or open supply chain?

Hiroshi Kitamura, Noriaki Matsushima, and Misato Sato
We explore the supply chain problem of a downstream durable goods monopolist, who chooses one of the following trading modes: an exclusive supply chain with an incumbent supplier or an open supply chain, allowing the monopolist to trade with a new efficient entrant in the future.

On sellers’ cooperation in hybrid marketplaces

Michele Bisceglia and Jorge Padilla
Hybrid marketplaces play a significant and growing role in the Internet economy. This paper shows that, other things equal, such platforms would maximize their profits if they lowered the fees charged to sellers and the prices charged to consumers in response to cooperation agreements between third-party sellers: horizontal mergers or collusive agreements

Employee bonding and turnover efficiency

Jonathan R. Peterson
This study explores how bonding contracts improve employee attraction and retention. The model offers several empirical findings regarding a variety of common bonding practices.