Issue 4

Roger Bate, Ginger Zhe Jin, and Aparna Mathur
Pharmaceutical products can be of poor quality either because they contain zero correct active ingredient (referred to as “falsified”) or because they contain a nonzero but incorrect amount of the right active ingredient (referred to as “substandard”). Although both types of poor-quality drugs can be dangerous, they differ in health consequence, price, and potential policy remedies. Assessing basic quality of 1437 samples of Ciprofloxacin from 18 low-to-middle- income countries, we aim to understand how price and nonprice signals can help distinguish between falsified, substandard, and passing drugs. Following the Global Pharma Health Fund e.V. Minilab® protocol, we find 9.88% of samples have less than 80% of the correct active ingredient and 41.5% of these failures are falsified. Falsified and substandard drugs tend to differ in two observable attributes: first, falsified drugs are more likely to mimic drugs registered with local drug safety regulators. Second, after controlling for other factors, substandard drugs are on average cheaper than passing generics in the same city but the price of falsified drugs is not significantly different from that of passing drugs on average. These data patterns suggest that careful consumers may have information to suspect a drug is substandard before purchase but substandard drugs can still exist to cater to poor and less-educated population. In contrast, falsified drugs will be more difficult for consumers to identify ex ante because they appear similar to high-quality, locally registered products in both price and packaging.

Leon Yang Chu and David E. M. Sappington
We analyze the design of procurement contracts when the supplier is privately informed about both his innate production capacity (K) and his innate unit cost of production. We identify conditions under which the supplier will strategically employ an inefficient production technology to expand output above K. We also show that when the buyer employs the simple fixed-price cost-reimbursement (FPCR) contracts in the setting examined by Rogerson (2003), the supplier has no incentive to exaggerate K. Furthermore, the buyer can secure with FPCR contracts at least 75% of the surplus she secures with fully optimal contracts.

Nicholas Argyres and Janet Bercovitz
The empirical literature in economics and strategy on contract structure, including on franchise contract structure, has been largely based on agency and transaction cost theories. The effects of bargaining power have been much less studied. This paper considers the role of independent franchisee associations in franchising relationships as a means to test for the presence of bargaining power effects. We find that the presence or absence of a franchisee association is significantly related to each of three key contractual and relationship characteristics: contract duration, noncompete stringency, and terminations/nonrenewals. This suggests that bargaining power should be accounted for in studies of contract structure and relationship outcomes.

Giovanni Immordino, Anna Maria C. Menichini, and Maria Grazia Romano
In a setting with a wishful thinking agent and a realistic principal, the paper studies how incentive contracts should be designed to control for both moral hazard and self-deception. The properties of the contract that reconcile the agent with reality depend on the weight the agent attaches to anticipatory utility. When this is small, principal and agent agree on full recollection. For intermediate values the principal bears an extra cost to make the agent recall bad news. For large weights, the principal gives up on inducing signal recollection. We also extend the analysis to the case in which the parameter of anticipatory utility is private information.

Matteo Bassi, Marco Pagnozzi and Salvatore Piccolo
We revisit the choice of product differentiation in the Hotelling model, by assuming that competing firms are vertically separated, and that retailers choose products' characteristics. The “principle of differentiation” does not hold because retailers with private information about their marginal costs produce less differentiated products in order to increase their information rents. Hence, information asymmetry within vertical hierarchies may increase social welfare by inducing them to sell products that appeal to a larger number of consumers. We show that the socially optimal level of transparency between manufacturers and retailers depends on the weight assigned to consumers' surplus and trades off two effects: higher transparency reduces price distortion but induces retailers to produce excessively similar products.