Volume 19, 2010 Issue 3 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy – Journal of Economics & Management Strategy

How Does Cost-Sharing Affect Drug Purchases? Insurance Regimes in the Private Market for Prescription Drugs

Avi Dor and William Encinosa
Insurance for prescription drugs is characterized by two types of cost-sharing: flat copayments and variable coinsurance. We develop a theoretical model to show that refill purchases of drugs are lower under coinsurance due to the consumer’s exposure to variation in drug prices. We test this empirically using claims data from eight large firms.

Slotting Allowances and Scarce Shelf Space

Leslie M. Marx and Greg Shaffer
Slotting allowances are payments made by manufacturers to obtain retail shelf space. They are widespread in the grocery industry and a concern to antitrust authorities. A popular view is that slotting allowances arise because there are more products than retailers can profitably carry given their shelf space.

Estimating the Impacts of Outlet Rationalization on Retail Prices, Industry Concentration, and Sales: Empirical Evidence from Canadian Gasoline Markets

Anindya Sen and Peter G.C. Townley
The retail gasoline industry in both Canada and the United States experienced a significant rationalization of outlets from the late 1970s through the 1990s. We estimate the impacts of reduced outlet density by exploiting the 27% decline in retail gasoline outlets across 10 Canadian cities between 1991 and 1997.

Introduction to the Symposium on Tournaments, Contests, and Relative Performance Evaluation

Theofanis Tsoulouhas
The papers in this symposium reflect several of the directions taken by current research on tournaments, contests and relative performance evaluation.

Efficient Contests

Christian Riis
In their seminal contribution, Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that wages based upon rank induce the same efficient effort as incentive-based reward schemes.

Career Tournaments

Pablo Casas-Arce
This paper studies a model of career concerns where (besides agents having different ability levels) principals are heterogeneous. Two types of heterogeneity are considered: principals can differ in their productivities, and in the visibility of the agents working for them.

Promotion Tournaments and Individual Performance Pay

Anja Schöttner and Veikko Thiele
We analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and linear individual performance pay in an employment relationship. An agent's effort is nonobservable and he has private information about his suitability for promotion.

Feedback and Motivation in Dynamic Tournaments

Florian Ederer
We investigate the choice to conduct interim performance evaluations in a dynamic tournament. When a worker's ability does not influence the marginal benefit of effort, the choice depends on the shape of the cost of effort function.

Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: Experimental Evidence

Oliver Gürtler and Christine Harbring
We theoretically as well as experimentally analyze tournaments in which one of the agents leads over the other before entering the tournament, that is, in which one of the competitors benefits from a head start.

On the Choice of Risk and Effort in Tournaments—Experimental Evidence

Petra Nieken
We investigate a simple two-person tournament in a controlled laboratory experiment. Each player chooses between two distributions of random shocks. After observing the overall risk, both players decide simultaneously on their effort.

Is the Coach Paid too Much?: Coaching Salaries and the NCAA Cartel

Amy Farmer and Paul Pecorino
Recently, a great deal of controversy has been generated from the salaries earned by head coaches in the NCAA. Although many figures in the world of sports earn high salaries, one important difference in the case of the NCAA is that the players do not get paid.

Issue 3

Volume 19 JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
Fall 2010