Issue 4

Volume 16 JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
Winter 2007

Horizontally Differentiated Market Makers

Simon Loertscher
I analyze a model of competition between two market makers who are located at the opposite ends of the Hotelling line, both of which are also occupied by a search market. Buyers and sellers are uniformly distributed between the two market places, yet can only trade at one of them. In equilibrium, market makers net a positive profit and trade with buyers and sellers close to them, while buyers and sellers further away participate in search markets. Interestingly, a duopolistic market maker nets a larger profit than a monopoly because search markets make the quantities market makers trade strategic complements.

Consumer Stockpiling and Price Competition in Differentiated Markets

Liang Guo and J. Miguel Villas-Boas
In many storable-goods markets, firms are often aware that consumers may strategically adjust purchase timing in response to expected price dynamics. For example, in periods when prices are low, consumers stockpile for future consumption. This paper investigates the dynamic impact of consumer stockpiling on competing firms' strategic pricing decisions in differentiated markets. The necessity of equilibrium consumer storage for storable products is re-examined. It is shown that preference heterogeneity generates differential consumer stockpiling propensity, thereby intensifying future price competition. As a result, consumer storage may not necessarily arise as an equilibrium outcome. Economic forces are also investigated that may mitigate the competition-intensifying effect of consumer inventories and that, hence, may lead to equilibrium consumer storage.

Measuring Word of Mouth’s Impact on Theatrical Movie Admissions

Charles C. Moul
Information transmission among consumers (i.e., word of mouth) has received little empirical examination. I offer a technique that can identify and measure the impact of word of mouth, and apply it to data from U.S. theatrical movie admissions. While variables and movie fixed effects comprise the bulk of observed variation, the variance attributable to word of mouth is statistically significant. Results indicate approximately 10% of the variation in consumer expectations of movies can be directly or indirectly attributed to information transmission. Information appears to affect consumer behavior quickly, with the length of a movie's run mattering more than the number of prior admissions.

Renegotiation Facilitates Contractual Incompleteness

Birger Wernerfelt
Attempts to economize on bargaining costs imply that two parties may write a contract which is incomplete in the sense that each party tacitly cedes some decision rights to the other. If decision makers can be disciplined by the threat of ex post renegotiation of decisions initially delegated to them, contracts may be even more incomplete. In the limit, the parties may leave all nonprice decisions out of the contract. By thus arguing that the threat of renegotiation facilitates contractual incompleteness, the paper reverses the direction of causality stressed by the literature.

Does Making Specific Investments Unobservable Boost Investment Incentives?

Randolph Sloof, Hessel Oosterbeek and Joep Sonnemans
Standard theory predicts that holdup can be alleviated by making specific investments unobservable; private information creates an informational rent that boosts investment incentives. Empirical findings, however, indicate that holdup is attenuated by fairness and reciprocity motivations. Private information may interfere with these, as it becomes impossible to observe whether the investor behaved fair or not. In that way unobservability could crowd out an informal fairness/reciprocity mechanism in place. This paper reports on an experiment to investigate this issue empirically. Our results are in line with standard predictions when there is limited scope for social preferences. But with sufficient scope for these motivational factors, unobservability does not boost specific investments.

Selection Tournaments, Sabotage, and Participation

Johannes Münster
This paper studies sabotage in tournaments with at least three contestants, where the contestants know each other well. Every contestant has an incentive to direct sabotage specifically against his most dangerous rival. In equilibrium, contestants who choose a higher productive effort are sabotaged more heavily. This might explain findings from psychology, where victims of mobbing are sometimes found to be overachieving. Moreover, sabotage equalizes promotion chances. The effect is most pronounced if the production functions are linear in sabotage, and the cost functions depend only on the sum of all sabotage activities: in an interior equilibrium, who will win is a matter of chance, even when contestants differ a great deal in their abilities. This, in turn, has adverse consequences for who might want to participate in a tournament. Because better contestants anticipate that they will be sabotaged more strongly, it may happen that the most able stay out and the tournament selects one of the less able with probability one. I also study the case where some contestants are easy victims, that is, easier to sabotage than others.

An Analysis of Pure-Revenue Technology Licensing

Neus Palomeras
This paper analyzes the incentives of patentholders to license their technologies for pure-revenue reasons. We hypothesize that this decision is mainly driven by characteristics of the innovation, which determine its technological attractiveness, the relevance of transaction costs in its transfer and the importance of the competition effect. By using the NBER Patent Citations Database and an original dataset of patented technologies devoted to license in an Internet marketplace, we find that importance, innovativeness, fit into the firm's core and scope of the innovation affect the patentholder's willingness to license it. Results increase our awareness on the drivers of technology licensing decisions.

Patient Admission Patterns and Acquisitions of “Feeder” Hospitals

Sayaka Nakamura, Cory Capps and David Dranove
Acquiring outlying community hospitals is one approach commonly used by large tertiary care hospitals to increase referrals. Sophisticated acquirers may also seek to selectively increase referrals of more profitable patients. To explore these issues, we study vertical hospital acquisitions. Using a treatment and control framework, we find that roughly 30% of vertical acquisitions lead to a significant increase in referrals. Very few result in decreases. We find that increases are concentrated among patients undergoing more profitable procedures and with more generous insurance. However, we find no evidence that hospitals shun patients with higher expected costs of care.

Inventories, Manufacturer Returns Policies, and Equilibrium Price Dispersion under Demand Uncertainty

Howard P. Marvel and Hao Wang
Returns policies can prevent a manufacturer's product from being discounted. Such discounting discourages inventory holdings, and can deny adequate retail representation to products with uncertain demand. We demonstrate that returns are not simply a substitute for resale price maintenance, but can instead be employed to support a desirable degree of price dispersion at retail. Surprisingly, optimal return policies depend only on market demand functions and marginal production costs. The manufacturer need not know the distribution of demand uncertainty for its product, but can instead rely on retailers to order appropriately. Our results generalize to oligopoly settings.