Issue 4

Volume 11 JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
Winter 2002

Do Pharmaceutical Sales Respond to Scientific Evidence?

Pierre Azoulay
I investigate how different sources of information influence the diffusion of pharmaceutical innovations. In prescription-drug markets, both advertising and scientific information stemming from clinical trials can affect physicians' prescription choices. Using novel indices of clinical-research output, I find that both marketing and scientific evidence directly influence the diffusion process in the antiulcer-drug market, with marketing having a more pronounced influence. I also find evidence that clinical outputs are important drivers of firms' marketing efforts, affecting sales indirectly. Taken together, the direct and indirect effects of science on demand imply strong private incentives for clinical research. I conclude that product-market competition in the pharmaceutical industry is shaped by both advertising rivalries and scientific rivalries. Moreover, drug advertising may perform an important informative function.

The Determinants of Organizational Change and Structural Inertia: Technological and Organizational Factors

Massimo G. Colombo and Marco Delmastro
There are a growing body of theoretical work, wide anecdotal evidence, and a few large-scale empirical studies supporting the view that business firms quite rarely change their organizational structure, a phenomenon usually referred to in the literature as structural inertia. The present paper aims to analyze empirically the determinants of structural inertia and organizational change. As far as we know, this work constitutes the first attempt to directly address such issues through econometric estimates based on a large, longitudinal dataset at plant level. For this purpose, we consider changes of the organizational structure within a sample composed of 438 Italian manufacturing plants observed from 1975 to 1996. More precisely, we specify and test a duration model of the likelihood of an individual plant changing the number of hierarchical tiers after a spell r, provided that no change has occurred up to T. We also analyze the direction of change, distinguishing increases from decreases of the number of managerial layers. We consider a set of plant- and industry-specific explanatory variables that are expected to induce or oppose organizational change. The findings show that the adoption of advanced manufacturing technologies and new human-resources management practices favors organizational change. On the contrary, the presence of sunk costs and the extent of influence activities figure prominently in explaining structural inertia of business organizations.

Open Source Software: Private Provision of a Public Good

Justin Pappas Johnson
A simple model of open source software (as typified by the GNU-Linux operating system) is presented. Individual user-programmers decide whether to invest their own effort to develop a software enhancement that will become a public good if so developed. The effect of changing the population size of user-programmers is considered; finite and asymptotic results are given. Welfare results are presented. It is shown that whether development will increase when applications have a modular structure depends on whether the developer base exceeds a critical size. Potential explanations of several stylized facts are given, including why certain useful programs don't get written.

Bundling and the Reduction of the Winner’s Curse

Indranil Chakraborty
The paper studies the effects of bundling on the bidding strategies and seller revenues in auctions when the bidders have common values for the objects. Bundling of objects before the auction reduces the problem of the winner's curse, and the bidders bid more aggressively. This does not mean that a bundled auction is always better for the seller's revenue. Indeed, there is another effect that makes the bundled auction preferable (from the seller's standpoint) if and only if the number of bidders is small. While this is the only effect present in an independent-private-values model, it does not vanish when bidders have pure common values for the objects. The paper concludes that a bundled auction is unambiguously better for the seller than separate auctions when the number of bidders is small.

In Support of Trigger Strategies: Experimental Evidence from Two-Person Noncooperative Games

Charles F. Mason and Owen R. Phillips
Cooperative equilibria can be supported in a repeated game when players use trigger strategies. This paper tests how well trigger strategies explain behavior in two-person experimental games. Reducing payoffs for choices larger than the Cournot level induces smaller average outputs, behavior generally consistent with trigger strategy models. Reducing payoffs for choices well above the Cournot level will not affect behavior if actions are consistent with a trigger strategy involving longer-lived, less intense punishment phases (the grim-reaper strategy), but would matter for trigger strategies with short-lived but intense punishment phases. Results show that behavior is most consistent with the former.