Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
  • HomeCurrent Articles
  • Articles
  • EditorsWho we are
  • Conferences
  • SubmissionsHow to Submit an Article
  • ContactGet in Touch
  • Search
  • Menu Menu

The impact of the number of sellers on quantal response equilibrium predictions in Bertrand oligopolies

Automatic‐renewal contracts with heterogeneous consumer inertia

Optimal team composition for tool‐based problem solving

Team formation with complementary skills

Dynamic incentive effects of assignment mechanisms: Experimental evidence

Trading places: An experimental comparison of reallocation mechanisms for priority queuing

Wage delegation in the field

When the principal knows better than the agent: Subjective evaluations as an optimal disclosure mechanism

Potential competition and quality disclosure

Does capital structure differently affect incumbents’ responses to entry threat and actual entry?

Address

Harvard Business School
Soldiers Field Road
Boston, MA 02163

617-496-8392

Published with

  • Home
  • Articles
  • Editors
  • Conferences
  • Submissions
  • Contact
  • Early View
  • Current Issues
  • Archives 2002 – 2011
  • Archives 1992 – 2001
  • Special Issues
  • Aims and Scope

Follow us on

Twitter

Facebook

Google+

Bookmarks

  • Documentation
  • Plugins
  • Suggest Ideas
  • Support Forum
  • Themes
  • WordPress Blog
  • WordPress Planet
© Copyright - Journal of Economic Management and Strategy | Website Design: Wildwood SEO
  • Twitter
  • Facebook
Scroll to top